Since the eruption of the protests on May 31, 2013, the class configuration of the GPPs occupied the forefront of discussions in both leftist and mainstream media. The debate revolved around whether the GPPs could be reduced to an instinctual and fastwaning reaction of the educated/secularist elite/middle classes, or if they represent an instance of persisting/foundational mobilization of wage-earning classes. In reference to this debate, we hold that a class-analytic lens to assess the involvement of classes and class fractions is particularly useful in illuminating the nature and orientation of social mobilization (Borras Jr, Edelman, and Kay 2008, 25) . This chapter thus opens with a theoretical discussion on Marxist class theory as developed in the works of Poulantzas and Wright. Based on that framework, the second section of the chapter develops a critique of mainstream middleclass accounts of the GPPs through a political economic analysis of Turkish wage-earning classes in light of empirical data. In turn, the last section shifts the focus from the objective locations of wage-earning classes and takes on an analysis of their ideological-political location in relation to "neoliberalism with Islamic characteristics" in the specificity of Turkey, which interrelates closely with their organizational class capacities.
Immediate mainstream accounts in June 2013 contended to brand the GPPs as an uprising of "middle classes" concerned almost exclusively about secularism. Paul Mason from the BBC portrayed the Gezi events as the revolt of "secular middle classes" albeit the participation of a minority of urban poor youth (Mason 2013) . The Economist echoed by stating that "the young middle class . . . chafes against the religious conservatism of the prime minister" (TheEconomist 2013c). In a similar manner, the Washington Post spoke of "the summer of middle-class discontent" in response to "the encroaching power of Islam" (Faiola and Moura 2013). The New York Times joined the chorus to call the protesters the "educated haves who are in some ways the principal beneficiaries of the regimes they now reject" (Keller 2013), and the Wall Street Journal depicted the protesters as "the 'white' secular elite" that eat "gourmet pizza," who are against the "'Black Turks,' a more pious lower class" (Bohn and Bayrasli 2013).
The "middle class" account was also used as a strategic tool of labeling by the government circles in Turkey in two ways: to underline the AKP's political and economic successes in supposedly raising the expectations of middle classes, and/ or to discredit the protesters as a well-off elite (that is argued to have no respect for religion). The AKP's deputy chairman Süleyman Soylu, for instance, held that middle-class membership in Turkey supposedly reached 43.5 million (59 percent of the population) thanks to the economic growth achieved under the AKP government, which explains the middle-class influence in Turkish politics (Erandaç 2013). The pro-government Anadolu Agency, similarly, linked the protests to Turkey's being an "emergent power" and a "regional force," but unlike the concurrent mass mobilization in Brazil in June 2013, protests here "are not based on social injustices" given its middleclass character (TGRTNews 2013). In order to discredit the protestors as privileged middle classes, the PM Erdoğan himself referred to them as a whisky-sipping, Bosphorus-gazing elite; a minority "upper-crust . . . imposing their ways on the country" (BBCTurkish 2013 , StarNews 2013 . He also insisted, despite lack of evidence, that they "drank beer in mosques" or "harassed
